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philosophy.	 The	 key	 works	 are	 Turing	 (1950)	 and	 Searle	 (1980).1	 I	 explore	 the	
arguments	of	these	two.	The	intent	is	not	a	pejorative	‘back	to	basics’,	but	rather	an	




















1	 In	 stating	 the	 problem	 is	 not	 new	 and	 in	 drawing	 attention	 to	 Turing	 and	 Searle	 as	 longstanding	
sources	of	key	ideas	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	the	history	of	AI,	computing,	robotics,	animatronics	
























In	 contemporary	 usage	 the	weak	 concept	 of	 artificial	 intelligence	 (AIw)	 focuses	 on	












reason,	 achieve	 goals,	 understand	 and	 generate	 language,	 perceive	 and	


























be	 tested	 and	 (mainly)	 observed.	 Here,	 function	 is	 primarily	 an	 expression	 of	




	 Many	 AI	 researchers	 are	 aware	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 specific	 and	
general	intelligence	is	based	on	a	blurring	of	what	‘intelligence’	itself	is.	For	example,	






















4	 There	 have	 been	major	 developments	 in	 specific	 ‘intelligence’,	 in	ways	 that	 address	 some	of	 the	
specific	 areas	 of	 complexity	 in	 the	 Stanford	 report	 quoted	 list	 of	 human	 achievements.	 The	 EMI	
program	has	successfully	imitated	the	work	of	Bach.	In	a	more	high	profile	case,	the	DeepMind	project	
at	Google	is	responsible	for,	AlphaGo,	which	is	now	able	to	defeat	a	human	Go	world	champion	using	









self-propagating.	 The	 intent	 to	 develop	 something	 human	 independent	 becomes	







may	do	 rather	 than	what	 a	 ‘intelligent	 entity’	 is	 and	may	be.5	 There	 is	 a	 tacit	 and	
sometimes	acknowledged	semantic	slippage	involved	since	AI	researchers	sometimes	
refer	to	AI	and	then	‘true	AI’,	with	the	latter	referring	to	a	fully	realised	entity.	Yet	AIw	




this	 has	 consequences:	 a	 calculator	 and	 a	 human	 function	 differently	 and	 are	
differently	complex,	but	are	as	‘intelligences’	not	properly	distinguished	constitutively	
or	qualitatively.	This	ambiguity	of	distinction	is	basic	to	AIw.	It	is,	as	we	shall	see,	rooted	
in	 Turing’s	 approach,	 though	 arguably	 Turing	 also	 made	 strong	 AI	 claims	 that	
encourage	a	focus	on	function	via	functionalism	as	constitutive	for	an	entity.	
One	 should	 note	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 kind	 for	 AIw	 is	 not	 clear-cut.	 Read	
sympathetically	in	context,	the	typical	intent	of	an	AIw	default	is	to	defer	discussion	of	
what	 AI	 may	 be	 in	 a	 constitutive-qualitative	 sense,	 until	 such	 time	 as	 it	 becomes	
germane.	This	is	conceptually	problematic	and	potentially	dangerous,	even	if	one	puts	
aside	doomsday	Terminator	scenarios.	The	previous	quote	from	the	Stanford	report	
states	 that	 matching	 human	 abilities	 is	 sufficient	 but	 not	 necessary	 (SbnN)	 as	 a	
benchmark	 for	 AI.	 Given	 that	 AI	 has	 already	 been	 subject	 to	 a	 spectrum	 that	
encompasses	function	referenced	to	a	calculator,	SbnN	introduces	a	component	that	
affects	the	coherence	of	this	way	of	defining	AI.	One	might	now	infer	anything	less	



























decentres	what	 it	 is	to	be	human	or,	to	be	 less	prejudicially	anthropocentric,	to	be	
equivalent	in	terms	of	possible	essential	characteristics	(since	these	invoke	issues	of	
kind	and	may	be	relevant	matters	to	address	in	terms	of	some	animals,	aliens	etc.).	
This	 is	 important	 because	 it	 is	 built	 into	 the	 conceptual	 construct,	 and	 so	 cannot	




of,	 for	example,	 the	Stanford	 report	are	aware,	what	matters	 is	how	technology	 is	
shaped,	and	how	technology	in	turn	will	shape	society.	Few	AI	scholars	set	out	to	be	
simple	 technological	 determinists.	However,	 the	disjuncture	 and	 focus	on	 function	
does	encourage	a	kind	of	tacit	weighting	towards	characteristics	of	determinism:	AI	is	
coming	 and	 we	 have	 to	 cope	 with	 it.	 Concomitantly,	 the	 disjuncture	 creates	






Whilst	AIw	 focuses	on	function,	 in	contrast	strong	artificial	 intelligence	 (AIs)	 takes	a	
step	back	to	consider	what	directs	function.	AIs	thus	locates	‘intelligence’	within	an	
expanding	set	of	characteristics	which	may	be	associated	with	this	direction:	purpose,	
awareness,	 cognitive	 unity,	 consciousness,	 self-consciousness	 etc.	 AIs	 is	 mainly	
concerned	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 entities.	 It	 focuses	 on	 the	 constitution	 that	 affects	
external	expression,	and	so	mediates	and	enables	function.	Moreover,	function	is	not	
the	only	concern,	being	merely	a	subset	of	the	consequences	of	the	existence	of	an	
entity.	 There	 are	 two	 main	 subcategories	 of	 an	 AIs	 conceptual	 focus.	 First,	 one	
subcategory	 focuses	on	 the	equivalence	between	human	and	 ‘AI’,	and	 thus	on	 the	
validity	 of	 analogical	 claims.	 This	 locates	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 intelligent	 within	
philosophy	of	mind.	Inter	alia,	when	posed	as	a	machine-mind	(program)	problematic	
it	 invites	 disputes	 regarding	 what	 function	 alone	 can	 reveal	 or	 allow	 one	 to	 infer	
regarding	the	nature	of	mind,	organic	or	otherwise.	Though	concerned	by	AI	the	main	
concern	is	with	the	human	and	what	AI	does	or	does	not	tell	us	about	the	human.	This	
focus	 follows	 from	 Searle’s	 work.	 Searle	 is	 concerned	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	
functionalism	 in	 cognitive	 science	 and	 with	 the	 mutual	 relation	 between	 this	
functionalism	and	AI.	His	‘Minds,	brains	and	programs,’	(1980)	raises	significant	issues	






some	 focus	 on	 imminent	 prospects.	 This	 is	 because	 AIs	 encompasses	 legal	 and	
regulatory	discussion	and	development.		
One	of	the	more	prominent	current	examples	of	the	latter	subcategory	of	AIs	




a	 seat	 of	 decision-making	 it	 becomes	 a	 source	 of	 concern	 regarding	 its	 material	
consequences.	 Here,	 there	 is	 some	 ambiguity	 that	 glosses	 over	 the	 difference	
between	a	locus	(site)	of	decision-making	and	a	source	of	decision-making,	with	the	
former	tending	to	inform	how	‘autonomy’	is	conceived.	In	any	case,	since	decision-
making	 can	 be	 programmed,	 an	 AIs	 set	 of	 legal	 concerns	 need	 not	 wait	 on	 any	
demonstrated	extensive	list	of	all	imaginable	AIs	characteristics.	‘Autonomy’	creates	a	




Moreover,	 since	 AI	 are	 also	 manifestly	 developing	 or	 changing,	 a	 legal	
perspective	 immediately	 invites	 forward	 thinking	 regarding	what	 an	AI	 is	 and	may	
become.	These	are	already	germane	 in	a	way	that	 they	are	not	necessarily	 for	 the	
programmer,	 the	 data	 analyst,	 the	 systems	 theorist,	 the	 economist	 etc.	 Note,	 the	
Stanford	project,	like	others	of	its	kind,	does	not	simply	ignore	a	legal	perspective	but	










are	 today’s	 robots	able	 to	perform	activities	which	used	 to	be	 typically	and	
exclusively	 human,	 but	 the	 development	 of	 autonomous	 and	 cognitive	
features	 --	 e.g.	 the	 ability	 to	 learn	 from	 experience	 and	 take	 independent	
decisions	--	has	made	them	more	and	more	similar	to	agents	that	interact	with	









autonomy	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 their	 nature	 in	 the	 light	 of	 existing	 legal	
	 7	
categories	 --	 or	 whether	 a	 new	 category	 should	 be	 created,	 with	 its	 own	
specific	 features	 and	 implications	 as	 regards	 the	 attribution	 of	 rights	 and	
duties,	 including	 liability	 for	 damage	 […The	 report	 recommends]	 creating	 a	
specific	 legal	 status	 for	 robots,	 so	 that	 at	 least	 the	 most	 sophisticated	
autonomous	 robots	 could	 be	 established	 as	 having	 the	 status	 of	 electronic	
persons	with	specific	rights	and	obligations,	including	that	of	making	good	any	
damage	they	may	cause,	and	applying	electronic	personality	to	cases	where	




purview	of	organizations.	However,	 it	 is	probably	more	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	
matters	 of	 AIw	 have	 provoked	 a	 partial	 AIs	 response.8	 The	 driving	 force	 even	 here	







has	 an	 adequate	 concept	 of	 the	 person	 and	 then	 some	 knowledge,	 based	 on	
realisation,	of	an	actual	electronic	person	--	so	an	AI	is	AI	problem	returns	in	a	different	















Conversation.	 As	 already	 noted	 AI	 researchers	 are	 aware	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 intelligence	 remains	
ultimately	ambiguous	and	that	it	might	be	preferable	to	have	a	‘human	independent’	measure;	various	
attempts	have	been	made	to	address	this	in	terms	of	function	that	increasingly	recognize	aspects	of	




reports	 on	 Robots	 and	 Artificial	 Intelligence.	 These	 invite	 expert	 evidence,	 and	 this	 includes	 from	






technology	 and	 its	 immediate	 prospects	 and	 an	 AIs	 approach	 to	more	 speculative	
possibilities.	 For	 example,	 the	 Harvard	 psychologist	 and	 public	 intellectual,	 Steven	
Pinker	praises	the	focus	on	function	as	a	means	to	overcome	‘spiritualism’	along	AIw	
lines,	but	adopts	a	speculative	AIs	position	to	make	the	point	that	future	AI	need	not	




of	 an	 AIs	 first	 subcategory	 framing:	 ‘What	 distinguishes	 natural	 from	 artificial	
intelligence	is	not	what	it	is	but	only	how	it’s	made’	(Wilczek	in	Brockman,	2015:	p.	
121).		





in	 different	 ways.	 Second,	 legitimating	 shifting	 does	 more	 than	 legitimate	 both	



















In	 an	 ordinary	 language	 sense,	 lower	 case	 transhumanism	 (th)	 is	 a	 portmanteau	
blending	of	‘transitional’	and	‘human’,	though	one	that	also	invokes	transforming	and	











changing,	 augmenting	 and	 enhancing	 their	 bodies,	 and	 also	 the	 context	 in	 which	
bodies	 are	 capable	 of	 achieving	 (and	 suppressing)	 things	 --	 in	 relation	 to	 persons,	
roles,	 agency	 etc.	 Consider	 some	 of	 the	 range	 of	 means	 by	 which	 this	 has	 been	
achieved	 over	 time:	 artefacts	 (tools,	 machines,	 prosthetics,	 exo-tech	 etc.),	
pharmaceuticals,	 surgical-intervention	 (transplants,	 implants,	 amputation),	
technologically	based	services	that	create	grounds	for	or	affect	human	activity	and	so	
forth.	Consider,	in	addition	to	‘augment’	and	‘enhance’,	some	of	the	further	language	
we	 apply	 to	 changes	 in	 terms	 of	 these	 means:	 facilitate,	 stimulate,	 extend,	
(re)generate,	suppress	(negate),	mutilate,	delegate,	perfect…	And,	consider	some	of	
the	 historical	 consequences	 of	 related	 change	 for	 the	 human.	 Health	 immediately	
springs	to	mind:	life	expectancy,	vitality,	heights,	weights,	shapes,	mental	states	etc.	
However,	many	other	aspects	of	living	can	also	be	thought	through	in	similar	ways.	
For	 example,	 our	 relation	 to	 time	 in	 terms	of	 how	 long	 given	 activities	 take,	what	
activities	 are	 possible,	 our	 sense	 of	 distance	 as	 a	 time	measured	 relation,	 our	 life	
ordering	through	clock	time	etc.				
If	translated	into	matters	of	social	ontology,	the	above	seems	no	more	than	a	
specific	way	of	making	 the	 general	 point	 that	 humans	 live	within	open	 systems	 in	
process.	Human	history,	the	history	of	the	human,	has	always	been	entangled	with	
invention	and	innovation.	Tool	use	is	as	old	and	older	than	Homo	sapiens.	However,	
changes,	 recognized	 potentials	 and	 speculations	 have	 made	 possible	 a	 particular	
discursive	 response	 regarding	 transition	 and	 transformation.	Modern	 surgery,	 the	
prospects	 for	 genetic	 manipulation,	 and	 continual	 development	 of	 information	





potential	 for	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 entity,	 the	 ‘posthuman’,	who	will	 live	 in	 new	 kinds	 of	
societies	that	welcome	and	celebrate	future	AI	as	equivalent	(and	different)	entities	
(see	 Regis,	 1991;	 O’Connell,	 2017).	 Though	 it	 has	 antecedents,	 the	 term	
Transhumanism	began	to	be	used	in	the	1980s.	A	World	Transhumanist	Association	
(WTA)	 was	 founded	 in	 1998,	 and	 there	 are	 several	 different	 versions	 of	 a	
Transhumanist	declaration	or	manifesto.	Key	aspects	of	the	WTA	declaration	are:	
	
Transhumanists	 advocate	 the	 moral	 right	 for	 those	 who	 so	 wish	 to	 use	
technology	 to	 extend	 their	 mental	 and	 physical	 (including	 reproductive)	
capacities	and	to	improve	their	control	over	their	own	lives.	We	seek	personal	
growth	beyond	our	current	personal	 limitations	[…]	 It	would	be	tragic	 if	the	







The	 core	 emphasis	 on	 the	 benefits	 of	 AI	 and	 on	 augmenting	 and	 ultimately	
transforming	 the	 human	 (and	 enabling	 posthumans)	 has	 outlasted	 the	 various	
incarnations	of	TH	organizations	(which	are	themselves	in	flux).12	Notably,	all	versions	
incorporate	 a	 moral	 argument:	 the	 right	 of	 free	 expression	 (where	 TH	 and	 the	
posthuman	 are	 creative	 and	 liberating)	 and	 a	 duty	 or	 obligation	 to	 recognize	 and	
accommodate	 fully	 realised	 AI	 entities.	 Many	 adherents	 of	 TH	 also	 prioritise	 a	
‘proactionary	principle’	over	a	‘precautionary’	one:	the	requirement	to	transcend	risk	
through	activity	 rather	 than	avoiding	or	 suppressing	change	because	of	 recognized	
risks	 (such	 as	 the	 loss	 of	 identity,	 quasi-Gattaca	 coercive/competitive	 eugenic	
societies,	worse-case	scenarios	of	abrupt	transition	to	fully	realised	AI	--	a	‘singularity’	
--	with	Terminator	consequences	etc).13	The	emphasis	on	benefits	and	the	weighting	
towards	 a	 proactionary	 principle	 is	 also	 associated	 with	 an	 ‘abolitionist’	 thesis:	






provoked	 an	 interest	 from	other	 perspectives.	 Various	media	 have	 pursued	 a	 ‘the	








potentials	 immediately	 invite	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 concern,	 and	 so	 parallel	 some	
aspects	of	how	AIs	has	been	motivated.	This	is	a	matter	of	(in	the	political	sense)	public	



















the	need	 for	 caution	 and	 intervention	beginning	 from	a	 ‘first	 do	no	harm’	 principle	 for	 the	human	
	 11	
Given	the	growing	attention	above,	various	academic	disciplines,	and	notably	
ethics,	 have	 oriented	 on	 th	 and	 TH.	 Again,	 there	 is	 some	 crossover	 here	 with	 AI,	





some	 degree	 from	 a	 set	 of	 humanities	 and	 cultural	 studies-based	 social	 theories	
collectively	referred	to	as	Posthumanism.	These	tend	to	be	critical	of	TH,	locating	it	as	
hasty	valorisation	of	novelty	and	fantasy	that	does	not	pay	due	attention	to	feasibility	









confusion.	 Literary	 theory,	 cultural	 studies,	 post-structuralism	 and	 postmodernism	
emphasise	 the	 entanglement	 of	 knowledge	 and	 power	 and	 tend	 to	 associate	 the	
Enlightenment	and	humanist	tradition	with	the	uncritical	projection	of	universals	that	
are	 actually	 expressions	 of	 oppressive	 and	marginalizing	 particularities,	 as	 well	 as	
sources	of	dangerously	posed	discourses	of	scientistic	science	that	foster	harms.	As	
such,	 decentring	 the	 human	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 important	 theory	 move	 in	 opposing	
problems	of	gender	constructs,	ecological	destruction	and	so	forth.	Many	realists	have	
great	 sympathy	 with	 the	 intent,	 but	 are	 sceptical	 regarding	 the	 ontological	
implications	of	subsequent	theory	and	critiques.17	There	is	some	crossover	here	with	
issues	already	explored	in	the	five	volume	Centre	for	Social	Ontology	working	group	
Morphogenic	 Society	 project	 (see	 Morgan,	 2016).	 Realists	 argue	 that	 the	 new	














17	One	might	also	note	Steve	Fuller’s	Humanity	2.0	 (2011)	here.	Fuller	raises	many	 important	 issues	
(especially	the	moral	horizon	of	the	human)	but	does	so	in	terms	of	his	usual	social	epistemology.	He	
sets	out	how	discourse	disputes	and	makes	ambiguous	science	in	society	but	ultimately	provides	no	



















Turing,	 the	 ordinary	 language	 sense	 of	 this	 question	 is	 too	 ambiguous	 and	 this	
impedes	any	satisfactory	answer.	As	such,	what	 is	required	is	a	substitute	question	
that	 can	 in	principle	be	answered.	 Specifically,	 could	a	machine	provide	 responses	
indistinguishable	 from	 those	 a	 human	 provides,	 and	 so	 pass	 for	 human?	 The	
substitution	 takes	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 thought	 experiment	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 test,	 the	
‘imitation	game’.	Turing	describes	 the	game	 initially	as	one	played	by	3	people:	an	











A	human	computer	 in	 these	 terms	 is	one	 that	would	be	 ‘following	 fixed	 rules’	and	
without	‘authority	to	deviate	from	them’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	436).	The	digital	computer	
(which	stands	in	the	place	of	AI)	is	then	described	as	an	extrapolation	of	contemporary	
technology:	 a	 technology	 that	 follows	 fixed	 rules	 where	 the	 technology	 is	 a	
combination	of	a	store	of	 information,	an	executive	unit	 that	carries	out	 individual	
operations	in	a	calculation,	and	a	control	table	of	instructions	(a	program	code).	Turing	
describes	 this	 digital	 computer	 as	 for-all-intents-and-purposes	 a	 ‘discrete-state	
machine’.	That	is,	one	that	follows	rules	and	shifts	from	one	definite	state	to	another,	
which	unless	error	occurs	is	ultimately	predictable	(in	a	basic	‘Laplacian’	sense).	It	thus	

















who	 does	 not	 deviate	 from	 fixed	 rule	 following	 behaviour.	 However,	 the	 human	
responses	 actually	 illustrated	 for	 the	 game	 are	 wide-ranging	 and	 include	 more	
naturalistic	responses.	They	do	not	focus	only	on	a	human	engaged	in	unequivocally	
fixed	 response	 answers	 to	 given	 questions.	 For	 example,	 they	 are	 not	 closed-end	
yes/no	 issues	 or	 simply	matters	 of	 a	 human	 calculating.	 Clearly	 this	would	 be	 too	





game:	 ‘C:	Will	 X	please	 tell	me	 the	 length	of	his	or	her	hair?’	 If	A	 is	 X:	 ‘My	hair	 is	
shingled	and	the	longest	strands	are	about	9	inches	long’	(Turing,	1950:	pp.	433-434).	
And	 then	 in	 the	 following	 section	 when	 identifying	 different	 ‘specimen’	 question	
forms:	‘Q:	Please	write	me	a	sonnet	on	the	subject	of	the	Forth	Bridge.	A:	Count	me	
out	on	this	one,	I	never	could	write	poetry’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	434).	For	Turing,	passing	
such	 a	 test	 is	 sufficient	 to	 answer	 the	 question:	 can	 a	machine	 imitate	 a	 human?	




expecting	 to	 be	 contradicted’	 (Turing,	 1950:	 p.	 442).18	 He	 situates	 this	 claim	 as	
‘conjecture’,	but	the	impression	conveyed	is	important.	The	claim	is	made	based	on	
the	digital	computer,	the	human	computer	and	then	the	intuitive	leap.	For	Turing,	the	
current	 impediment	 to	 playing	 the	 game	 is	 processing	 capacity	 and	 speed.19	 The	






































indistinguishable	 from	a	human	 then	 this	 is	 irrelevant.	 The	 implication	 is	 thus	 that	
equivalence	is	not	identity	of	constitution	but	similarity	of	outcome.	In	the	context	of	
the	 claim	 about	 machines	 thinking,	 the	 implication	 is	 thus	 that	 behavour	 is	 the	
significant	locus	that	allows	the	inference	that	a	machine	can	think.	If	one	reverses	the	
line	of	reasoning	then	the	implication	is	also	that	the	internal	operation	of	the	human	
in	 the	 act	 of	 thinking	 is	 conducive	 to	 the	equivalence	of	 outcomes	 and	equivalent	
status	(both	the	human	and	machine	‘think’).	The	‘difference’	thus	seems	to	make	no	
‘difference’.	However,	Turing	also	notes	the	objection	that	the	game	is	not	a	test	of	
consciousness,	 since	 the	digital	machine	 is	not	 required	 to	 (or	demonstrate	 that	 it	
actually	can)	know	what	it	is	doing,	or	feel	emotion.	This	seems	to	indicate	that	Turing	
is	simply	claiming	that	the	test	is	purely	a	matter	of	simulation	based	on	the	game.		








subsequent	 caveat:	 ‘I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 give	 the	 impression	 that	 I	 think	 there	 is	 no	





he	 immediately	moves	 onto	 the	 possible	 objection	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	
humans	 follow	 laws	of	behaviour	and	actual	activity	 is	variable	 in	 terms	of	specific	
conduct.	Here,	he	notes	that	general	laws	of	behaviour	may	exist	that	condition	the	
scope	of	variability	in	specific	conduct.	Turing	seems	to	be	implying	here	that	general	
laws	 inhere	 in	 the	human	thinking	and	so	equivalence	 is	an	 interior	matter	of	 rule	
following	behaviour	rather	than	merely	exterior	circumscribed	equivalent	outcomes.	
There	 is,	 therefore,	 grounds	 to	 infer	 based	 on	 Turing’s	 argument	 that	 a	 human	
thinking	and	a	digital	computer	thinking	are	(or	could	in	the	future	be)	doing	the	same	
thing.					
It	 remains	 the	 case	 that	 Turing’s	 position	 is	 sufficiently	 underdeveloped	 to	
allow	different	 interpretations.	As	a	consequence,	there	is	a	 line	of	AIs	subcategory	
work	 that	explores	Turing’s	 imitation	game	 in	 terms	of	what	he	actually	 intended,	
including	whether	he	intended	the	game	to	be	behavioural	in	its	implications	because	
of	 its	 functional	 focus	 (for	early	examples	that	assess	the	debate	see,	Millar,	1973;	
Lassegue,	 1988).	 This	 notwithstanding,	 the	 point	 I	 want	 to	 emphasise	 is	 that	 the	
direction	of	argument	Turing	pursues	in	terms	of	key	objections	follows	a	pattern.	He	
affirms	the	relevance	of	the	imitation	game	as	a	valid	test	and	does	so	by	orienting	on	
the	significance	of	behaviour,	 function	and	equivalence.	This	enables	a	 slide	 in	 the	
argument	such	that	equivalence	is	a	matter	of	function,	which	is	suggestive	of	more	
than	mere	function:	function	becomes	the	significant	indicator	of	‘thinking’.	So,	whilst	
there	 are	 manifest	 tensions	 in	 the	 way	 Turing	 reasons,	 his	 argument	 conveys	 an	
impression	regarding	‘thinking’	relevant	to	(and	encouraging)	both	AIw	and	AIs	despite	
that	 the	 game	 is	 about	 imitation.20	 Since	 it	 has	 given	encouragement	 to	both,	 the	
original	problematic	created	by	Turing	is	thus	multiply	suggestive,	and	so	ambiguous	
in	 its	 particular	 implication,	 despite	 that	 it	 is	 constructed	 to	 enable	 definitive	
consideration	 of	 what	 Turing	 considers	 would	 otherwise	 be	 too	 amorphous	 a	
problem.	This	returns	us	to	Turing’s	intent.	Turing	intends	to	find	a	question	that	can	
be	answered	that	can	stand	in	for	an	ordinary	language	approach	to:	can	machines	



























and	 semantic	 consistency	 of	 an	 individual	 response.	 The	 terms	 of	 the	 game	 thus	
conceal	the	problems	of	complex	improvisation	and	the	naturalistic	feel	that	such	a	
conversation	must	convey.	Turing	does	not	resolve	these	problems,	since	his	actual	
examples	 (quoted	 previously)	 focus	 on	 individual	 or	 single	 responses	 rather	 than	
strings	or	pathways	of	interactive	dialogue.21	His	first	example	(hair)	seems	to	reduce	
questions	 and	 answers	 to	 a	 simple	 problem	 of	 logic	 where	 a	 game	 is	 deductive	
elimination	(e.g.	x	is	not	B	because	of	answer	z).	His	second	example	(the	sonnet)	is	
simply	a	form	of	evasion.	However,	the	former	example	as	human	conversation	could	
quickly	 become	 confounded	 by	 non	 sequitur,	 confusion	 and	 ambiguity	 as	
characteristics	of	the	conversation,	and	so	a	deductive	approach	as	coding	would	find	
this	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	cope	with.	Coding	responses	that	sought	to	rectify	the	
problem	 by	 putting	 the	 conversation	 back	 on	 track	 would	 immediately	 strike	 an	
interrogator	 as	 non-naturalistic,	 creating	 suspicion	 likely	 leading	 to	 failure	 in	 the	
seamless	substitution	(machine	for	man)	aspect	of	the	imitation	game.	The	very	name	
of	 the	 game	 trades	 on	 a	 conflation	 of	 two	 different	 purposes:	 imitation	 qua	







Both	 examples	 highlight	 that	 an	 interrogator	 is	 an	 interlocutor	 within	 a	
dialogical	open	process.	As	such,	it	is	not	clearly	established	that	the	Turing	test	can	
be	passed	based	on	the	basic	foundations	of	technology	as	stated,	and	extrapolated	
from,	by	 Turing:	 a	 discrete-if-universal	machine.	Multiplying	discrete	 functions	 is	 a	
confusion	of	what	universal	implies,	since	it	indicates	universality	is	merely	additive.	
This	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 continues	 to	 dog	 contemporary	 AI	 technology.	 There	 is	 a	
difference	between	operative	efficacy	 in	a	 task	and	navigating	seamlessly	between	
tasks	 (AI	 researchers	 typically	 refer	 to	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 specific	 and	 general	




















expectations	 for	 the	 range	 of	 interactions	 and	 builds	 in	 anticipations	 of	 errors,	
evasions	and	inconsistencies	that	then	become	‘idiosyncrasies’.	This	is	quite	different	
than	 simulating	 a	 fully	 operational	 adult	meeting	 core	 norms	within	 any	 given	 yet	
open-ended	 socio-cultural	 milieu	 over	 an	 extended	 duration.	 Passing	 the	 Royal	
Society	event	test	thus	quickly	became	a	matter	of	what	kind	of	test	was	passed	based	
on	what	kind	of	coding.	The	best-known	AI	event	is	the	annual	Loebner	competition,	






important	 not	 to	 traduce	 Turing.	His	 specific	 development	of	 the	 form	of	 a	 digital	
computer	 is	 as	 a	 discrete-state	 machine	 with	 definite	 input-output	 relations.	
However,	in	discussing	objections	he	considers	the	possibility	of	a	‘learning’	machine	




and	communication	creates	 the	possibility	 that	an	effective	digital	 computer	 could	
draw	 on	 blocks	 of	 similar	 responses	 from	 similar	 situations,	 and	 so	 simulate	
naturalistic	language	with	a	level	of	apparent	sophistication	that	an	interlocutor	would	
deem	appropriate.	This	possibility	 falls	under	 the	remit	of	 ‘learning’	programs.	The	
implication	 is	 that	 it	 is,	as	Turing	claimed,	only	 (though	perhaps	mainly)	processing	
capacity	and	speed,	and	 time	 (time	 for	AI	 to	 ‘learn’,	 time	 for	coding	 to	develop	as	
problems	 are	 identified	 and	 solved)	 that	 stand	 between	 the	 digital	 computer	 and	
successful	playing	of	the	game.	There	is	also	a	convergent	technology	argument	here,	
since	 imminent	 developments	 such	 as	 quantum	 computing	 offer	 the	 possibility	 of	
significant	 leaps	 in	processing	capacity	and	speed	(if	so	then	Moore’s	 law	does	not	
confront	 the	 impending	 limit	 entailed	 by	 non-quantum	 processing).	 The	 inference	
drawn	 would	 then	 be	 that	 chatbots	 such	 as	 Apple’s	 Siri	 and	 Amazon’s	 Alexa	 will	
become	 or	 have	 descendants	 that	 are	 increasingly	 naturalistic	 in	 their	 interactions	








the	 terminology	 across	 the	 field	 is	 likewise	 changing	 as	 new	 fields	 propagate.	 AI	
research	 has	 moved	 on	 from	 simple	 discrete-state	 input-output	 concepts	 and	






passing	 the	Turing	 test,	what	AI	 researchers	do	will	ultimately	 (if	 later	 than	Turing	
anticipated)	fulfil	the	expectation	that	‘one	will	be	able	to	speak	of	machines	thinking	
without	expecting	to	be	contradicted’	(Turing,	1950:	p.	442).	However,	consider	how	













modes:	 1)	 supervised	 learning	 (a	 network	 system	 is	 fed	 an	 example	 dataset	 that	
exemplifies	 what	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 achieve,	 such	 as	 spam	 identification)	 2)	
unsupervised	learning	(a	network	system	is	fed	an	example	dataset	and	is	set	up	to	
look	 for	 patterns,	 clusters	 anomalies	 in	 the	 data,	 which	 then	 become	 the	 specific																																																									
‘We	show	that	standard	machine	learning	can	acquire	stereotyped	biases	from	textual	data	that	reflect	
everyday	 human	 culture...	 stereotypes	 and	 empirical	 associations,	 has	 long	 been	 known	 in	 corpus	
linguistics…	 	 since	 we	 performed	 our	 experiments	 on	 off-the-shelf	 machine	 learning	 components	
[primarily	the	Global	Vectors	for	Word	Representation	(GloVe)	word	embedding],	we	show	that	cultural	
stereotypes	 propagate	 to	 artificial	 intelligence	 (AI)	 technologies	 in	 widespread	 use.’	 Caliskan	 et	 al	
(2017:	p.	183).	This	is	in	addition	to	related	problems	that	commercial	chatbots	are	often	designed	with	











26	 So,	 there	 is	 an	 immediate	 issue	here	 since	 simulation	of	neurons	 is	 a	 claim	 that	 the	operation	 is	
neuron-like,	though	once	one	starts	to	consider	the	actual	structure	of	the	technology	rather	than	the	
claim	 made	 then	 it	 becomes	 clear	 the	 statement	 of	 neuron-like	 owes	 more	 to	 metaphor	 than	
substantive	evidence.		
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output	 within	 a	 broader	 data-defined	 remit,	 such	 as	 fraud	 patterns	 in	 insurance	
claims)	3)	reinforcement	learning	(a	network	system	is	fed	an	example	dataset	and	













the	 coding	 that	 Turing	was	working	with,	 but	 as	 yet	 a	 barrier	 still	 exists	 based	 on	
































Based	 on	 the	 argument	 so	 far	 Turing’s	 replacement	 seems	 like	 a	 shift	 that	
encourages	problematic	foci,	rather	than	a	warrantable	substitution.	An	‘answerable’	
question	can	be	inappropriate	or	at	least	insufficient,	and	this	can	become	increasingly	
evident	 as	 time	 passes	 and	 subsequent	 work	 is	 undertaken.	 So,	 one	might	 argue	
Turing	 creates	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 that	 ingrains	 a	 bifurcation	 between	 focus	 on	
function	(with	at	least	implicit	problematic	consequences	for	entity	characteristics	-	
intelligence,	thinking,	learning)	and	reactions	that	draw	attention	back	to	entities	that	
reconsider	 the	 nature	 of	 intelligence,	 thinking	 and	 learning	 as	 well	 as	 further	
characteristics.			
At	this	point	one	might	be	tempted	to	say:	so	what?	If	AIw	is	a	focus	on	function	
and	 AI	 research	 cumulatively	 develops	 to	 achieve	 specific	 functions	 then	 does	 it	
matter	whether	an	AI	really	thinks,	has	intelligence	and	learns?	In	a	trivial	sense	the	
answer	may	well	be	no.	However,	in	a	more	basic	sense	whether	an	AI	really	thinks	













thus	 feeds	 TH.	 Concomitantly,	 the	 focus	 on	 function	 can	 marginalise	 proper	
consideration	 of	 what	 is	 also	 lost	 for	 humans	 through	 what	 is	 done	 on	 behalf	 of	
humans.	I	will	say	more	about	this	in	terms	of	relational	goods.		
As	a	last	point	here	consider	the	inter	alia	effect	of	the	Turing	imitation	game.	
Function	 is	 highly	 seductive.	 It	 can	 become	 its	 own	 self-confirming	 technocratic	
























to	 the	 framework	 where	 simulation	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 substitute	 question:	 can	
machines	think?	It	is	based	on	this	emphasis	that	interstitial	problems	(based	on	the	
foci	of	AIw	and	AIs	and	the	emphasis	of	the	latter)	can	be	identified.	Responding	to	the	






(1980).	 His	 point	 of	 departure	 is	 the	 mutual	 influence	 that	 the	 prominence	 of	
computerisation	has	had	for	and	with	cognitive	science,	and	hence	problems	in	the	
philosophy	 of	 mind.	 He	 distinguishes	 the	 use	 of	 computers	 to	 study	 the	 mind	 (a	





with	 the	 problem	 of	 functionalism,	 and	 initially	 with	 behaviourism.	 His	 aim	 is	 to	
demonstrate	that	the	mind	and	a	computer,	as	currently	conceived,	are	not	the	same	
(and	so	one	cannot	claim	that	how	a	computer	works	explains	how	a	mind	works).	In	
so	 doing	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 Turing	 attempts	 to	 put	 aside	 the	 problem	 of	
consciousness,	and	yet	the	imitation	game	as	a	simulation	remains	subject	to	critique.	
The	 point	 of	 the	 critique	 is	 to	 establish	 that	 a	 computer	 and	 a	 human	 mind	 are	
different,	 even	 if	 the	 superficial	 consequences	 can	 be	 the	 same:	 a	 successful	
simulation	remains	merely	a	successful	simulation,	unless	one	can	demonstrate	that	
the	inner	workings	of	both	mind	and	computer	(again	standing	in	for	AI)	have	similar	
characteristics.	His	 focus	 is	 thus	on	 the	entity	 rather	 than	merely	 the	outcome.	He	
clearly	sets	out	a	first	subcategory	AIs	position,	and	the	argument	can	be	located	as	a	
primary	refutation	of	the	substitute	question	that	simulation	is	supposed	to	offer.	




thought	 experiment.	 	 A	 person	 is	 placed	 in	 a	 locked	 room,	 which	 contains	 some																																																									
31	Pre	Searle,	perhaps	the	most	notable	are	Block	and	Gunderson.	Note,	Block	provides	a	prototype	






















lines,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 interpretation-as-translation	 of	 the	 symbols.	 This	 is	 quite	
different	 than	what	 a	 human	 does	when	 communicating.	 To	 emphasise	 this	 point	
Searle	introduces	an	additional	feature	to	the	experiment.	The	person	is	also	required	
to	 answer	 a	 parallel	 set	 of	 questions	 in	 English.	 As	 a	 native	 speaker,	 the	 person’s	
answers	to	these	questions	are	also	adequate,	and	so	the	appropriateness	of	answers	














are	 relevant	 here.	What	 is	 relevant	 is	 that	 this	 sets	 a	 pattern.	 Searle	 and	 others’	













game	 be	 played?’	 response	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘can	 the	 experiment	 be	 constructed?’.	
However,	there	are	limits	to	this	line	of	reasoning,	since	the	argumentation	scheme	

















made	 inferences	 from	 the	 part.	 The	 Chinese	 room	 argument	 is	 in	 this	 sense	















as-experiential	 in	 the	 world,	 could	 have	 or	 develop	 to	 be	 what	 Searle	 claims	 the	
Chinese	room	establishes	that	AI	cannot	demonstrate	(intelligence,	internal	semantic	
significance,	awareness	etc.).	
For	 Searle,	 all	 these	 replies	 miss	 the	 point.	 The	 room	 orients	 on	 a	 core	
difference:	 formal	 symbol	manipulation	 in	 contrast	 to	 comprehension	of	meaning.	
There	are	different	 terms	 involved	and	 these	are	not	 synonymous	 (understanding,	
meaning,	intelligence,	awareness,	consciousness),	and	so	more	might	be	said	about	
each,	 but	 this	 is	 irrelevant	 or	 superfluous	 to	 the	 initial	 insight	 of	 the	 thought	





not	 establish	 that	 it	 has	 the	 capacity.	 So,	 simulation	 remains	 merely	 successful	
simulation.	However,	 this	 clearly	 does	 not	 deter	 critics,	 since	 they	 are	 still	 able	 to	
reverse	Searle’s	point,	partly	because	of	the	limits	of	what	can	be	claimed	from	the	
Chinese	room	argument.		
The	 argument	 only	 establishes	 that	 successful	 simulation	 is	 insufficient	 to	
establish	that	a	computer	and	a	mind	are	the	same,	and	that	an	AI	can	have	significant	
mind-like	 characteristics.	 It	 does	 not	 establish	 impossibility.	 As	 such,	 responses	
continue	 to	 develop	 along	 three	 mutually	 related	 lines:	 (1)	 what	 intelligence,	
understanding	etc	are	is	more	ambiguous,	contingent,	contestable,	and	nuanced	than	




way	 Searle	 mis-specifies	 the	 problem	 in	 parts).	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 Searle’s	
intervention	has	ultimately	become	part	of	 the	continuing	discourse	 initially	set	by	










































this	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 human	 brain	 as	 organic	 or	 biological	 phenomena.	
Awareness,	consciousness,	self-consciousness,	understanding,	meaning,	 intelligence	







similar	 mutual	 points	 of	 reference.	 This	 mutuality	 is	 grounded	 in	 or	 becomes	 an	
organizing	 feature	 of	 the	 social	world	 built	 up	 from	 ‘status	 function	 declarations’,	
typically	 in	 the	 form	of	 ‘X	counts	as	Y	 in	C’.	The	declaration	 imposes	a	 function	on	
objects	and	people	 that	are	not	 simply	performable	by	virtue	of	physical	 structure	


























than	 what	 we	 know	 about	 ourselves.	 The	 case	 of	 AI	 seems	 to	 be,	 therefore,	 an	
either/or	issue	that	hinges	on	evidence	in	a	way	that	is	different	than	how	we	attribute	
in	 other	 cases.	 Those	 other	 cases	 are	 shared	 aspects	 of	 the	 human	 (degrees	 of	
awareness	etc)	one	might	attribute	to	animals,	what	we	attribute	to	other	humans	
(since	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	assume	they	are	 like	us),	and	what	we	might	attribute	 to	
aliens	(since	they	may	be	like	us).	Each	of	these	is	not	designed	by	us	and	so	does	not	








caveats,	 Searle	 seems	 to	 have	 (at	 least	 inadvertently)	 disallowed	 any	 practical	
demonstration	 because	 he	 seems	 tacitly	 committed	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 an	 artificial	
entity	is	by	definition	synthetic	and	so	can	only	demonstrate	simulation.	Put	another	
way,	 though	Searle	 claims	 that	AI	 confuses	 simulation	with	duplication	 (simulating	
understanding	is	not	actual	understanding,	so	is	not	duplicating	it)	the	reverse	is	that	
he	 resists	 the	 possibility	 that	 anything	 other	 than	 a	 brain	 can	 duplicate,	 and	 thus	
realise	 given	 states	 (and	 yet	 a	 synthetic	 heart	 is	 not	 a	 simulation-only).	 Searle	
inadvertently	over-writes	fallibility	and	future	contingency	via	current	‘forgetting’.		
So,	 for	 critics,	 Searle	 has	 done	more	 than	 he	 set	 out	 to	 do.	 This	 is	 a	 basic	
vulnerability	that	critics	have	developed	to	different	degrees	and	with	more	or	 less	
sympathy	for	the	original	argument:	his	position	takes	a	plausible	intuition	regarding	
difference,	 but	 requires	 its	 own	 assertions	 regarding	 what	 might	 be	 the	 basis	 of	
understanding;	 it	 thus	 involves	 a	 tacit	 certainty,	 which	 critics	 can	 draw	 further	









causal	 process	 of	 which	 syntax	 is	 a	 part).	 The	 question	 then	 becomes,	 how	 it	 is	















of	 Searle’s	 case	 continues	 to	 provoke	 responses	 along	 these	 lines.	 Insufficiency,	
assumptions,	 consequences	 for	 argumentation,	 and	 then	 dependence	 on	 context	







mind	 (e.g.	 Churchland	 and	 Churchland,	 1990),	 professional	 philosophers	 able	 to	
deconstruct	 the	case	and	parse	 its	many	 implications	as	they	pertain	to	semantics,	
functionalism,	 alternative	 views	 of	 intentionality	 etc	 (e.g.	 Boden	 1988;	 Chalmers,	
1992;	 Pinker	 1998;	 Fodor,	 1992;	 Dennett,	 2013),	 and	 futurists	 with	 agendas	 that	
entangle	 AI	 and	 TH	 (Kurtzweil,	 2000).35	 As	 a	 point	 of	 convergence,	 then,	 Searle’s	




that	 reminds	 cognitive	 science	 that	 the	 brain	 is	 significant	 for	 the																																																									
34	It	is	ironic	perhaps	that	I	am	pointing	this	out	as	an	exercise	in	doing	the	same.		
35	Pinker,	for	example,	stands	on	the	opposite	side	to	Searle	as	committed	to	a	variety	of	functionalist	








machine	was	designed	to	do…	The	computational	 theory	of	mind	 is	 indispensable	 in	addressing	the	
questions	we	 long	 to	 answer…	 the	 content	of	brain	 activity	 lies	 in	 the	patterns	of	 connections	 and	
patterns	of	activity	among	the	neurons.	Minute	differences	in	the	details	of	the	connections	may	cause	
similar-looking	brain	patches	to	implement	very	different	programs.	Only	when	the	program	is	run	does	
the	 coherence	 become	 evident…	 The	 computational	 theory	 of	 mind	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as	 the	
despised	‘computer	metaphor.’	The	claim	is	not	that	the	brain	is	like	commercially	available	computers.	
Rather,	 the	claim	 is	 that	brains	and	computers	embody	 intelligence	 for	 some	of	 the	same	reasons.’	








its	 constitution).	 However,	 it	 is	 less	 odd	when	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 strength	 of	
Searle’s	argument	is	also	its	weakness:	it	has	a	tight	argument	for	a	clear	distinction,	




weakness	 is	 that	 the	 combination	 provides	 for	multiple	 lines	 of	 reasonable	 reply.	
Concomitantly,	Turing’s	game	and	Searle’s	room	are	by	far	the	most	cited	works	on	AI	
(partly	because	use	exceeds	a	focus	on	AI	only).	In	April	2017,	a	Google	scholar	search	
on	 ‘Mind,	 Brains	 and	 Programs’	 returned	 over	 59,000	 results,	 and	 ‘Computing,	
Machinery	and	Intelligence’	more	than	176,000.	
Ironically,	 Searle’s	 attempt	 to	 simplify	 and	 focus	 debate	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 core	



















argument	 has	 not	 created	 agreement.	 It	 has	 become	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 for	
reasonable	disagreement.	If	one	works	backwards	through	all	the	material	we	have	

















critique	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	 way	 an	 argument	 is	 situated	 with	 a	 basic	 general	
problem	that	an	argument	is	situated	at	all.	This	is	particularly	important	in	locating	




It	 begs	 questions	 of	 functionalism	 regarding	 the	 constitution	 of	 entities	 and	 their	
causal	powers.	As	such,	much	of	the	perpetuation	of	functionalism	in	spite	of	Searle’s	




concerned	 with	 function?	 However,	 the	 nature	 of	 concern	 flows	 from	 what	 is	
considered	and	 in	what	ways.	 Focus	does	not	necessarily	 create	 clarity,	but	 rather	
potentially	adverse	normativity.	The	very	existence	of	AIw	is	a	deferment	of	the	status	
of	entities	that	presupposes	the	ineluctability	of	AI	as	technology.	There	is	an	‘AI	 is	
coming	 and	we	must	 cope’	 that	 decentres	 the	 seat	 of	 decision	making,	 as	 though	
human	 choices	were	 not	 dictating	whether	 and	what	 kinds	 of	 AI	 develop	 and	 are	
adopted.	 ‘Cope’	becomes	 ‘let’s	 get	on	with	 it’	 as	 though	 the	basis	of	 function	was	
settled.	This	has	a	‘meanwhile’	or	inter	alia	context.	AIs	may	not	have	settled	anything,	
but	the	basis	of	non-settlement	invites	a	focus	on	function,	and	typically	presumes	a	
functionalist	 frame	of	 reference.	So,	dominant	aspects	of	 the	concept	of	AIs	are	at	
least	 associated	 with	 the	 general	 pervasiveness	 of	 AIw.	 As	 such,	 the	 bifurcation	
between	these	two	that	I	previously	referred	to	is	not	without	mutuality,	and	this	is	
important,	 since	 it	 is	 because	 of	 mutuality	 that	 some	 issues	 or	 foci	 or	 ways	 of	
conceiving	are	marginalised,	inadequately	developed	or	become	interstitial.		
As	 already	 noted,	 if	 functionalism	 dominates	 then	 the	 problem	 of	 being	
becomes	a	problematic	of	doing,	which	in	turn	can	become	a	problem	of	efficiency.	
The	human	‘doing’,	as	tasks,	becomes	a	taskmaster	mastering	our	sense	of	what	the	
human	 is.	 This	 is	 sociological	 rather	 than	 purely	 philosophical	 (involving	 the	
positioning	and	relative	power	of	 ideas,	rather	than	just	the	substantive	content	of	
those	ideas).	A	focus	on	efficiency,	for	example,	may	absorb	the	social	context	that	
dominates	and	expresses	 (represses)	 intrinsic	aspects	of	 the	human.	Efficiency	 is	a	



























entities	do	but	which	ultimately	expresses	an	 is	 (a	be):	 ‘intelligence’	 is	an	accepted	
everyday	associative	term	qua	AI,	according	to	everyday	referential	communicative	
acts	between	humans	AI	 do	 ‘learn’...	 Socialisation	 through	 language	use	 is	 already	
occurring	around	function.	The	world	we	live	in	is	thus	drawing	us	into	a	future	we	are	









work	 that	 has	 been	 done.	 Nor	 is	 it	 to	 invite	 unreasonable	 expectations	 of	 what	















order	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 significant	 characteristics	 of	 the	 human	 in	 relation	 to																																																									
37	There	is	a	great	deal	less	talk	of	artificial	stupidity.		
	 31	
meaning	 cannot	 be	 demonstrated	 for	 an	 AI,	 and	 yet	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
constitution	of	the	organic	brain	that	creates	causal	power	in	terms	of	mind,	though	
Searle	 is	 wary	 of	 this	 language	 of	 distinction	 between	 brain	 and	 mind	 due	 to	 its	
historical	legacy	and	connotations.								
	 Of	 course,	 many	 ontologically	 oriented	 elaborations	 are	 possible,	 and	 an	




to	 Lawson,	 the	 subject	 matters	 of	 Searle’s	 ontology	 and	 social	 ontology	 seem	 to	
require	a	concept	of	emergence	to	express	properties	for	and	in	entities	and	systems	
(Lawson,	 2016).	 In	 his	 reply	 to	 Lawson	 Searle	 rejects	 this	 claim,	 in	 so	 far	 as	what	






of	 the	 distinctions,	 if	 the	 point	 of	 emergence	 is	 first-and-foremost	 to	 express	 the	
properties	that	would	not	occur	without	the	organization,	and	so	the	properties	are	
irreducible	 to	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 decomposed	 parts	 -–	 structural	 integrity	 is	 a	
characteristic	of	a	building,	consciousness	of	the	brain,	and	trust	of	a	community,	in	
so	far	as	appropriately	constituted	and	active/activated.	All	require	the	organization-
as-constitution	 to	 be	manifest	 or	 to	 be	 possible,	 but	 not	 all	 involve	 an	 additional	
property	that	is	unexplained	that	we	deem	additional	since	it	is	so	far	unexplained	(as	








of	 the	grounds	of	a	property	not	whether	 in	 fact	 the	property	 is	 fully	comprehended	regarding	 the	
organization-as-constitution.	 If	 this	 were	 so	 then	 the	 very	 moment	 we	 had	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	








Just	 because	one	 knows	and	designs	 a	house	 to	have	 structural	 integrity	does	not	mean	 structural	
integrity	 does	 not	 ‘emerge’	 from	 the	 constitution-as-combination	 (it	 is	 a	 product	 of…).	 One	 can	 of	
course	argue	about	whether	one	wants	to	term	this	emergence	or	simply	state	that	the	constitution	
produces	(where	the	latter	still	does	not	differentiate	consciousness	and	structural	integrity	except	in	
so	 far	 as	 currently	 known	 –	 an	 epistemic	 rather	 than	 ontic	 distinction),	 and	 one	 can	 argue	 about	
whether	one	wants	to	refer	to	consciousness	and	artifacts	as	of	the	same	kind	or	category	of	this	more	
general	 category.	 It	 is	 these	 that	 Searle	 seems	 to	actually	be	 contesting	and	 Lawson	does	not	help	
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associates	 with	 emergence.	 However,	 if	 social	 ontology	 requires	 a	 concept	 of	






and	 obligations	 for	 socially	 positioned	 humans)	 and	 artefacts	 (non-human	 though	
socially	 constituted	 and	 specified	 objects)	 as	 emergent	 social	 entities,	 and	 makes	
particular	reference	to	 language	as	an	 important	emergent	system.	One	might	also	
note	 that	 since	 for	 Lawson	 artefacts	 are	 not	 communities,	 AI	 introduces	 a	 further	
potential	 issue	 for	 Lawson’s	 social	 ontology,	 by	 virtue	 of	 what	 an	 AI	 may	 be.	 In	










personal	motivation.	 Social	 reality	 creates	 cross-referenced	duties,	 obligations	 and	
requirements.	 In	 simplest	 form,	 promise	 keeping	 demonstrably	 creates	 desire-
independent	 reasons	 for	 action.	 In	 general,	we	use	 institutions	without	destroying	






himself	 here	 by	 emphasizing	 novelty,	 which	 seems	 to	 imply	 cannot	 be	 or	 is	 not	 known	 (which	 is	
different	but	related	to	cannot	be	predicted	–	the	qualifiers	matter	as	do	matters	a	posteriori).	Acting	
back	upon	creates	a	dispute	in	terms	of	organization	as	constitution	(but	even	here	one	can	argue	that	





approach.	 According	 to	 it	 individuals	 rather	 are	 merely	 ‘counted’	 as	 in	 effect	 being	 appropriately	
positioned,	with	associated	positional	powers	or	functions.	I	say	‘in	effect’	because	positions,	positional	
powers/functions,	and	positioning	are	not	Searle’s	language.’	(Lawson,	2016:	p.	370).	For	Lawson,	the	
development	 of	 language	 presupposes	 practices;	 social	 objects	 do	 not	 require	 contradiction	 in	 the	










to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 constitution	 of	 social	 reality	 presupposes	 the	 possibility	 of	
refusal,	and	so	of	choice.	For	example,	an	obligation	is	not	an	obligation	if	there	is	no	









The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 Searle’s	 main	 social	 ontology	 use	 of	 AI	 remains	
contrastive	with	 the	 human,	 following	 the	 insight	 developed	 in	 the	 Chinese	 room	
thought	experiment	regarding	symbol	manipulation.	Searle	relocates	his	critique	of	
functionalism,	 residual	 behaviourism	 and	 cognitive	 science	 in	 order	 to	 support	 his	
argument	for	the	construction	of	social	reality:		
	
The	 notion	 of	 a	 deontic	 power	 makes	 no	 sense	 unless	 you	 presuppose	
consciousness	 and	 the	 gap.	 Once	 you	 regard	 the	 creatures	 as	 like	 the	
computational	models	common	in	cognitive	science,	then,	it	seems	to	me,	you	
cannot	 have	 institutional	 reality	 in	 our	 sense.	 You	 might	 program	 the	







mind	 we	 are	 familiar	 with.	 As	 such,	 his	 focus	 is	 what	 AI	 does	 not	 demonstrate	
regarding	what	mind	is.	Equally,	however,	one	might	ask	what	would	be	the	causal	
capacities	of	a	conceivable	AI	mind,	since	it	surely	follows	they	need	not	be	the	same	
as	 those	 of	 a	 human,	 if	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 entity	 is	 different.	 This	 is	 second	
subcategory	AIs.		It	is	contrastive	in	a	mirroring	sense.	An	AI	entity	may	have	equivalent	
characteristics	 as	 categorisations	 to	 the	 human	 (intelligence,	 understanding,	











dictated	 by	 processing	 power	 and	 subject	 to	 cumulative	 'error'.	 It	 is	 the	 drawing	
together	of	fragments	according	to	narratives	and	purposes	(projects).	It	is	inherently	




actual	 significance	 of	 memory.	 Memory	 is	 active,	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 cannot	 be	
'dispassionate'	 (see	 McGilchrist,	 2009).43	 This	 is	 different	 than	 an	 objectivity-




Contrast	 this	 with	 AI	 as	 archetypally	 conceived.	What	 kind	 of	 being	 is	 the	
product	of	eidetic	functionality?	What	is	learning	and	experience	to	an	entity	of	error	
correction?	Moreover,	consider	the	difference	in	the	grounds	of	being	through	time.	










not	entail	 a	 radical	disjuncture	between	 reality	 and	appearance.	Nagel’s	 famous	bat	argument	also	
comments	on	Turing:	‘Consciousness	is	what	makes	the	mind	body	problem	really	intractable…	[and	
reductionist]	 discussions	 of	 the	 problem	 give	 it	 little	 attention	 or	 get	 it	wrong.’	 (1979:	 p.	 165).	 He	
differentiates	 this	 from	 the	 Turing	 machine-IBM	 problem	 which	 are	 ‘successful	 reduction’	 but	 are	
unlikely	to	shed	light	on	the	mind	body	problem	since	‘we	have	at	present	no	conception	of	what	an	




has	 conscious	 mental	 states	 if	 and	 only	 if	 there	 is	 something	 that	 it	 is	 like	 to	 be	 that	 organism	 -	
something	it	is	like	for	the	organism.	We	may	call	this	the	subjective	character	of	experience.	It	is	not	
captured	by	any	of	the	familiar,	recently	devised	reductive	analyses	of	the	mental,	for	all	of	them	are	
logically	 compatible	 with	 its	 absence.	 It	 is	 not	 analyzable	 in	 terms	 of	 any	 explanatory	 system	 of	
functional	 states,	 or	 intentional	 states,	 since	 these	 could	 be	 ascribed	 to	 robots	 or	 automata	 that	
behaved	like	people	though	they	experienced	nothing.’	(1979:	p.	166)	According	to	Nagel,	if	physicalism	
as	reduction	to	material	states	is	to	be	defended	then	phenomenological	features	must	themselves	be	
given	 a	 physical	 account,	 but	 this	 seems	 impossible	 in	 so	 far	 as	 ‘every	 subjective	 phenomenon	 is	
essentially	 connected	 with	 a	 single	 point	 of	 view.’	 (1979:	 p.	 167)	 Nagel’s	 main	 point	 is	 that	
psychophysical	reduction	is	a	move	towards	greater	objectivity	by	removing	species-specific	points	of	
view	toward	the	object	of	investigation,	in	terms	of	general	effects	and	properties	that	are	not	simply	












experienced	 feeling	 for	 another’s	 -	 typically-	 adverse	 situation)	 be	 for	 an	 entity	
without	 the	 biochemistry,	 and	without	 first	 person	 expectation	 and	 experience	 of	
finitude,	degeneration	and	suffering?	Where	would	sentimentality	and	compassion	




might	construct	 this	as	a	component	of	 sensuality,	but	what	would	be	 the	general	













a	 profound	 clash,	 creating	 a	 conflicted	 constitution	 of	 self	 (an	 inner	 life	 and	











would	 be	 different	 without	 desire,	 since	 many	 aspects	 of	 how	 we	 engage	 with																																																									
44	Inter	alia,	AI	may	be	an	efficient	cause	but	also	may	be	its	own	material	cause;	categorisation	of	cause	
within	a	typology	may	become	blurred.		














projects	as	 simply	products	of	desire	 (by	 suggesting	 they	 lack	 reflexivity,	durability	
etc),	but	rather	to	suggest	desire	may	be	something	different	or	absent	for	an	AI.					
Desire	in	general	is	expressive	in	a	way	that	having	a	goal	only	need	not	be.	It	
is	a	bodily	 relation	of	 thought	 (see	Damasio,	1994).	The	body	of	an	AI	as	a	seat	of	









a	 human,	 dream-states	 are	 important	 for	 waking	 states	 as	 sources	 of	 inspiration,	










precisely	 because	 assumptions	 regarding	 duplication	 in	 one	 aspect	 do	 not	 require	
assumed	duplication	in	the	other	that	the	potential	differences	can	be	explored.	It	is	
why	 they	 have	 been	 a	 staple	 of	 science	 fiction	 and	 of	 futurist	 speculation	 for	
decades.46	It	is	also	why	such	speculation	has	also	been	translated	as	critique	of	the	
Chinese	 room	 thought	 experiment	 (most	 obviously	 via	 the	 robot	 objection).	 In	 TH																																																									
46	 The	 speculation	 sits	 within	 a	 broader	 universe	 of	 philosophical-as-speculative	 argument.	 For	
example,	the	possibility	that	our	reality	is	a	cosmological	virtual	reality	space:	if	a	material	species	in	a	
material	universe	survives	long	enough	to	achieve	advanced	technology	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	it	















not	 demonstrate	 about	 a	 human)	 it	 is	 less	 helpful	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 may	 be	 the	
different	constituent	aspects	of	an	AI	once	a	dividing	line	has	been	drawn.	It	is	under	
elaborated	 in	 this	 way	 (however,	 see	 Preston	 and	 Bishop,	 2002).	 Posed	 in	 purely	
philosophical	 terms	 this	 may	 seem	 unimportant,	 since	 Searle’s	 original	 argument	
regarding	whether	AI	is	in	fact	thinking	has	not	simply	disappeared.	But	the	problem	
is	not	just	philosophical,	it	is	sociological	regarding	the	consequences	of	philosophy.	
The	 very	 separation	 into	 subcategories	 has	 become	 a	 problem	 in	 this	 sociological	
context.	Working	across	 the	subcategories	has	become	a	challenge,	partly	because	






experiment	 to	 assess	 the	moral	 capacities	 of	 an	 artificial	 entity.	 But	 consider	 the	
broader	 problem	 of	 context	 based	 on	 increasing	 recognition	 of	 problems	 and	
potentials	of	the	actual	technologies	that	are	developed	under	the	aegis	of	AI.		
Here	one	might	note	the	2017	23	Asilomar	AI	Principles	that	are	intended	to	
guide	 the	 future	 development	 of	 AI.47	 These	 heavily	 emphasize	 control,	 benefit,	
common	 good,	 risk	 assessment	 and	 caution.	However,	 the	 principles	 are	 not	 legal	
injunctions,	nor	do	they	refer	to	intrinsic	(or	set	binding	extrinsic)	limits	to	technology,	
nor	can	they	prevent	alternative	interest-incentives	that	may	subvert	the	principles	(a	




activity	 that	 is	 affected	by	 the	dominance	of	 concerns	 that	have	 accompanied	 the	
development	of	categorizations.	Recall	the	case	of	EU	deliberations	on	AI,	the	idea	of	
an	 electronic	 person	 was	 not	 central,	 and	 yet	 was	 recognized	 to	 be	 increasingly	
important	to	address.	Manifestly,	based	on	the	development	of	categorizations,	the	
problems	are	multi-faceted:	normalisation	of	AI,	the	issue	of	‘cope’,	functionalism	and	
function,	 but	 now	 also	 dividing	 line	 inertia’s	 that	 reduce	 the	 urgency	 or	 resist	 the	



















not	 a	 philosophy	 of	 the	 social	 sciences;	 it	 is	 a	 simplified	 (rather	 than	 simplistic)	
apparatus	that	expresses	the	common	constituents	from	which	social	reality	is	built.	
The	claim	is	that	all	human	institutional	reality	is	created	and	maintained	by	a	‘single	
logico-linguistic	 operation’:	 status	 function	 declaration,	 and	 so	 has	 a	 ‘common	
underling	structure’	 (2010:	p.	201).	Two	problems	arise.	First,	 the	position	requires	
that	 status	 function	 declaration	 be	 fully	 descriptive	 of	 the	 structure	 and,	
concomitantly,	second,	the	position	requires	that	other	and	further	matters	are	not	
significant	for	both	the	structure	of	social	reality	and	what	occurs	on	in	and	through	
that	structure,	where	this	 is	deemed	to	be	actual	constituted	social	 reality,	since	 if	
they	 are	 significant	 then	 the	 structure	 itself	 is	 also	 not	 quite	 the	 structure-in-
operation,	 which	 seems	 like	 a	 tension	 or	 incompleteness	 if	 not	 a	 contradiction	 in	
terms	of	what	structure	is	vis-à-vis	creation	and	maintenance.		
One	needs	to	be	careful	not	to	traduce	Searle	here.	Searle’s	social	ontology	
(like	all	of	his	work)	 is	brilliant.	However,	 it	also	has	 its	 limits	and	 like	all	works,	 its	
points	of	 pressure.	 Searle	has	 configured	his	 claim	 regarding	 social	 ontology	 to	be	
internally	 consistent	 but	 in	 so	 doing	 he	 has	 preconfigured	 it	 to	 be	 potentially	
misleading.	The	claim	is	that	human	institutional	reality	is	fully	accounted	for	and	so	
created	and	maintained	by	an	instantiated	variety	of	his	social	ontology.	Since	Searle	
is	 the	 one	 to	 define	 institutions	 through	 rule	 construction,	 and	 defines	 rule	
construction	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 status	 function	 declaration,	 then	 it	 is	 by	 logical	
consistency	that	the	claim	acquires	coherence.	But	the	inference	is	that	social	reality	
is	 fully	 accounted	 for,	 rather	 than	 it	 is	 an	 internal	 system	 of	 rule	 creation	 and	
reproduction	that	is	accounted	for.	Coherence	becomes	credence.	Social	ontology	is	
a	concern	with	social	being,	Making	the	Social	World	and	The	Construction	of	Social	






expressive	 of	 what	 society	 is.	 This	 seems	 slightly	 ironic	 if	 one	 considers	 how	 the	
Chinese	room	thought	experiment	is	directed	(code	is	insufficient	for	comprehension)	
rather	 than	 how	 it	 is	 formulated.	 Searle’s	 structure	 (his	 social	 ontology	 as	 status-
function	 declaration)	 does	 not	 internalize	 error,	 ambiguity,	 conflict,	 contingency,	










of	 this	 for	Searle	 is	delegated	as	 ‘background’).49	The	formal	operative	potential	of	
directed	 language	 use	 becomes	 the	 overwhelmingly	 significant	 aspect	 of	 society.	
However,	one	might	argue	that	everything	else	matters	to	what	actually	occurs	and	
so	what	things	become	in	and	through	time.	If	one	is	to	warrant	the	claim	that	a	social	
ontology	 can	 be	 the	 philosophy	 for	 social	 science	 it	must	 also	 be	 a	 philosophy	 of	
society.50	It	must	be	sociologically	operative.	Searle	is	confident	that	his	approach	is.	
Status-function	 declaration	 as	 social	 ontology	 does	 more	 than	 merely	 confirm	 an	
internally	consistent	claim	regarding	the	logico-linguistic	statement	of	itself	as	theory.	
The	claim	 is	also	that	 it	has	more	than	merely	some	purchase	on	social	 reality.	For	
Searle,	it	is	the	building	blocks	of	institutional	reality,	and	also	a	basis	for	explanatory	














Donald	 Trump	 in	 terms	 of	 deontic	 powers,	 institutions,	 institutional	 facts,	 and	
rationalities	through	reasons	for	acting,	but	arguably	doing	so	would	not	provide	a	
satisfying	 explanation	 (of	 personhood,	 life	 projects,	 integration	 into	 existing	
possibilities	of	institutions	in	decay,	changes	through	time	based	on	interactions	in	the																																																									
49	This	is	implicit	in	Lawson’s	critique	of	Searle	and	occurred	to	me	whilst	reading	that	critique;	notably,	
‘the	 sort	 of	 totality	 it	 is…	 has	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	 sorts	 of	 positions	 and	 power	 relations	 that	will	 be	
involved’	(2016:	p.	388).		
50Consider:	actual	operative	deontology	 is	not	abstract	 logic	 it	 is	also	the	 integration	of	 institutional	
conditions	with	possible	life	projects	and	ultimate	concerns.	This	is	a	sociological	problem	not	reducible	
to	constitutive	rules	or	institutional	facts	along	the	lines	typically	stated	by	Searle.	It	is	the	feeling	of	
and	 for	 a	 system.	 Searle’s	 logic	 of	 reason	may	not	 be	 ill-founded	but	 the	 framing	of	 reason	 seems	




















to	 the	Chinese	 room	situated	 in	 terms	of	his	ontology	and	 social	ontology	provide	
limited	resources	as	ways	to	think	about	any	realized	AI	(since	its	constitution	is	likely	
to	be	different).	One	might	now	add	to	that,	though	the	point	is	contestable	based	on	
competing	 ontologies,	 the	 ontology	 and	 social	 ontology	 within	 which	 Searle’s	
approach	to	his	Chinese	room	argument	is	situated	(a	reversal	of	the	above	phrasing)	





the	 social	 ontology	provides	 limited	 resources	 for	 exploring	 society	as	a	 system	 in	
operation,	and	‘AI’	is	an	important	source	of	change	and	challenge	within	that	system.		
If	one	is	to	consider	processes	in	time	then	one	needs	an	ontology	of	process	













we	began	 from,	 I	 suggested	 this	exhibited	an	AIw	position,	whilst	 it	 simultaneously	
acknowledged	 the	 role	of	 law	etc	 in	 relation	 to	 this,	which	 I	 suggested	was	 also	 a	





lives…	Given	 the	 speed	with	which	AI	 technologies	 are	 being	 realized…	 the																																																									




Study	 Panel	 recommends	 that	 all	 layers	 of	 government	 acquire	 technical	
expertise	 in	AI…	Faced	with	 the	profound	changes	 that	AI	 technologies	 can	
produce,	pressure	for	‘more’	and	‘tougher’	regulation	is	probably	inevitable.	
Misunderstandings	 about	 what	 AI	 is	 and	 is	 not	 could	 fuel	 opposition	 to	
technologies	with	the	potential	to	benefit	everyone.	Inappropriate	regulatory	




controls…	 This	 in	 turn	 supports	 the	 development	 of	 professional	 trade	
associations	and	standards	committees	that	spread	best	practices…	(Stone	et	
al,	 2016:	 p.	 10)	 ‘Policies	 should	 be	 evaluated	 as	 to	 whether	 they	 foster	
democratic	values	and	equitable	sharing	of	AIs	benefits,	or	concentrate	power	
and	 benefits	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 fortunate	 few…	 [Thereafter,	 AI	 must	 be	





the	page	10,	 since	 the	 latter	 (taking	privacy	as	an	archetype)	emphasises	 that	one	
should	 resist	 regulation	 until	 well	 informed	 and	 suggests	 the	 best	 source	 of	 such	
information	is	the	best	practice	that	emerges	from	trade	associations	and	standards	
committees.	 It	 leads	 to	 a	 dominance	 of	 self-regulation	 in	 market	 situations	 by	
powerful	private	parties	to	those	situations.	In	general,	this	assumes	that	information	
and	 practice	 are	 already,	 or	 are	 developing	 along,	 lines	 that	 are	 objectively-as-
universally	 beneficial	 and	 that	 this,	 furthermore,	 is	 either	 normatively	 beneficial	
through	 development	 and	 discussion	 by	 parties	 or	 is	 a	 situation	 of	 normative	
neutrality	 in	 relation	 to	 technology	 (since	 more	 and	 better	 information	 and	 best	
practice	are	 intrinsic	to	processes	and	these	are	associated).	But	this	then	requires	
that	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 change	 and	 innovation	 within	 the	 world	 and	 under	 the	
authority	of	the	requisite	bodies	is	expressible	in	these	beneficial	ways	and	that	no	









authorises	 those	 who	 own	 rather	 than	 those	 who	 are	 subject	 to	 consequences.	
Concomitantly,	it	creates	a	barrier	to	broadening	and	democratising	deliberation	and	
participation	 in	 the	 process	 by	which	 change	 occurs	 and	 through	which	 change	 is	
shaped.	AI	 is	what	AI	does	and	AI	will	be	what	AI	researchers	do	acquire	more	of	a	









AI	 applications	 is	 potentially	 adverse	 arrogation	 rather	 than	 justified	 extension.	 A	
camouflage	 of	 concerned	 language	 disguises	 a	 basic	 logic	 that	 requires	 that	 the	
specific	 interests	 of	 some	 become	 the	 engine	 by	 which	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 will	
manifest.	Now	consider	how	the	two	are	supposedly	integrated,	aligned	or	mediated:	
it	is	not	in	relation	to	citizens	as	citizens	only.	It	is	citizens	as	consumers,	citizens	as	






by	 what	 the	 many	 want	 and	 need.	 Corporations	 are	 disciplined	 in	 this	 primitive	
democratic	expression	of	individual	power	that	becomes	collective	power	through	its	
effect	on	the	profits	of	corporations.	However,	 the	value	of	human	 lives	 is	not	 the	
focus	or	goal	of	this	system,	 it	 is	deemed	to	be	an	unintended	consequence	of	the	














internet	 connectivity.	Another	 example	 is	 that	 in	 the	 absence	of	 prohibition,	AI	 as	
smart	 algorithms	 can	produce	opaque	 artificial	 stupidity	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 contest	
because	of	the	apparent	objectivity	of	big	data	and	quantified	metric	based	decisions	
(affecting	everything	from	credit	access	because	of	credit	ratings,	to	who	gets	fired	
based	 on	 ‘performance’	 measures).	 What	 both	 these	 examples	 illustrate	 is	 that	
corporations	can	control	the	infrastructure	of	contemporary	life	through	AI	in	ways	
that	 preconfigure	 the	 social	 world	 of	 the	 consumer.	 Thereafter,	 specific	 AIs	 can	







options	 with	 no	 consequence	 to	 themselves	 but	 every	 consequence	 for	 the	
corporation.	 An	 information	 and	 best	 practice	 approach	 favours	 those	 who	 are	
already	powerful	by	virtue	of	position	through	control	of	 information	or	resources,	




marginalise	 the	 important	 issue	 of	 what	 is	 important	 to	 human	 concerns	 or	
flourishing.	In	addition	to	the	context	of	consumption,	AI	has	major	ramifications	for	
work.	 A	 discursive	 split	 is	 beginning	 to	 emerge	 between	 those	who	 argue	 that	 an	
imminent	AI	(and	robotic	AI)	revolution	will	be	transformative	and	liberating	and	those	
who	argue	it	will	be	devastating.	The	former	is	typically	expressed	as	an	intent	to	‘take	





preventing	 a	widespread	 response	of	 transition	 to	 some	other	 kind	of	work,	 since	
there	will	be	insufficient	scope	for	that	work	---	capitalist	creative	destruction	is	this	







conditions,	 since	 if	 they	do	not	 resist	 then	 the	 system	of	 corporations	 is	 adversely	
affected	collectively	by	the	self-interest	of	every	individual	corporation	(though	there	
is	nothing	new	about	this	tension,	since	Marx	was	able	to	point	it	out	150	years	ago).	









of	 latent	 anxiety	 rather	 than	 front-and-centre	 urgent	 debate).	 So,	 in	 the	 case	 of	
citizens	as	consumers	there	seems	to	be	an	adverse	assumption	that	it	is	by	opting	in	
and	out	of	markets	that	most	problems	will	be	solved,	and	in	the	case	of	citizens	as	
































been	 based	 on	 the	 capacity	 to	 work	 from	 anywhere	 at	 anytime	 (in	 connective	
employment)	or	to	be	called	in	to	work	at	anytime	(in	‘gig’	economies).	In	this	context	





societies	 confront	 a	 demographic	 problem	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 aging	 population	
combined	with	 reduced	birth	 rates	and	disaggregated	patterns	of	 living,	 creating	a	
problem	of	care	for	the	elderly;	AI	and	smart	accommodation	based	on	an	internet	of	
things,	 combined	 with	 robotics,	 are	 now	 being	 considered	 likely	 solutions	 to	 this	
problem.	Ostensibly,	 this	more	 than	 any	 other	 area	 seems	 one	 in	which	 potential	
benefits	 will	 manifest.	 However,	 it	 still	 shares	 with	 all	 the	 other	 areas	 set	 out	 an	




53	 And	 so	 the	 problem	 of	what	 is	 a	 person	 and	 in	what	 sense	 they	 flourish	 and	 suffer	 is	 centrally	
important;	there	is	great	scope	for	development	here	of	a	naturalistic	ethics	(if	what	a	person	is	affects	
how	a	person	flourishes).	Searle,	for	example,	considers	this	in	terms	of	human	rights	in	Making	the	




powerful	 consequences	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 favours	 what	 already	 exists	 in	 terms	 of	
tendencies,	interests	and	power.	Following	Turing	and	Searle,	AIs	creates	a	whole	host	
of	issues	that	never	quite	bring	together	a	central	concern	with	technology	as	is	and	
the	human	who	 is	affected.	 Inter	alia	ontology	 is	 rendered	 interstitial,	 and	yet	 the	
issues	are	quintessentially	a	matter	of	ontology	and	social	ontology.	In	terms	of	this	
final	matter	of	 the	 realm	of	citizen	welfare	one	 insightful	 conceptual	 innovation	 in	
social	ontology	is	Donati	and	Archer’s	relational	goods.	Relational	goods	provide	an	
important	 way	 to	 think	 about	 how	 the	 human	 is	 nurtured	 in	 and	 through	 social	
relations.	 For	 Donati	 and	 Archer	 relational	 goods	 are	 goods	 created	 and	 enjoyed	
through	 relations,	 they	 involve	some	activity	which	 is	 its	own	reward	but	 that	also	
creates	collective	social	benefits.	Such	goods	are	diverse	and	are	constituted	as	the	
quality	of	a	relation	that	arises	between	people,	such	as	trust,	as	well	as	the	quality	of	





nurture	 and	 become	 the	 products	 of	 enduring	 relations.54	 They	 cannot	 simply	 be	
created	by	law	or	dictate.	They	cannot	be	captured	or	appropriated	by	any	given	party	
and	 cannot	 be	 commodified,	 bureaucratised	 or	 marketised	 without	 the	 relations	
themselves	 being	 subverted	 in	 ways	 that	 corrode	 the	 goods	 that	 are	 otherwise	
constituted.	 They	 are	 ‘pro-social’	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 contribute	 to	 the	 integration	of	
society,	 but	 they	 also	 do	not	 fit	 readily	 into	 traditional	 categories	 of	 the	 public	 or	
private	sphere,	since	the	former	is	associated	with	administrative	provision	of	goods	
by	the	state	and	the	latter	with	the	marketisation	of	goods	by	corporations,	neither	of	
which	 captures	 the	 sense	 of	what	 relational	 goods	 are	 or	 provides	 unproblematic	
grounds	for	the	constitution	of	relations	from	which	they	arise.	However,	according	
to	Donati	 and	 Archer,	 relational	 goods	 ‘correspond	 to	 fundamental	 human	 needs’	
(2015,	p	215)	and	‘If	these	goods	are	ignored,	dismissed	or	repressed,	the	entire	social	
order	 is	 impoverished…	 with	 serious	 harm	 caused	 to	 people	 and	 the	 overall	
organization	[of	society]’	(2015:	p.	203).		
The	 concept	 of	 relational	 goods	 can	 appear	 amorphous,	 but	 this	 seems	 a	
consequence	of	what	the	concept	 is	 intended	to	articulate,	rather	than	a	failure	of	





Smith’s	 set	 is	 the	 set	 of	 required	 constituents,	 rather	 than	merely	 a	 list	 of	 possible	 characteristics.	
Lawson	also	provides	a	variety	of	naturalistic	ethics.			
54	In	general,	Donati	and	Archer	claim	that	relational	goods	require:	1)	a	personal	and	social	identity	of	
participants	 (they	 cannot	 be	 anonymous	 for	 each	 other)	 2)	 non-instrumental	 motivation	 of	 each	
subject;	the	relation	must	involve	more	than	achievement	of	some	end	3)	participants	must	acquire	or	
be	inspired	by	rule	of	reciprocity	as	a	symbolic	exchange	4)	sharing:	goods	can	only	be	produced	and	










of	 human	 care…	 replacing	 the	 human	 factor	with	 robots	 could	 dehumanise	 caring	
practices,’	(EP,	2016:	p.	9).	What	is	clear	is	that	a	concept	of	relational	goods	provides	




The	 proof	 that	 today’s	 public	 ethics	 do	 not	 involve	 a	 common	 good	 in	 a	





and	 helping	 the	 poor	 with	measures	 that	 promote	 passivity,	 Problems	 are	
confronted	by	putting	people	where	they	cannot	cause	trouble.	These	are	false	
solutions	to	problems	because	they	are	not	inspired	by	the	common	good	in	
that	 they	 leave	 aside	 completely	 the	 necessity	 of	 involving	 poor	 and	
marginalized	people…	In	the	arena	of	social	policies,	it	is	now	very	clear	that	
these	modalities	for	confronting	distress,	poverty,	and	social	marginalization	










world.	Searle	 is	surely	correct	that	social	science	 is	an	 investigation	 into	a	single	(if	
multiply	 produced	 and	 constructed	 and	 disputed)	world	 (2016).	 This	 is	 a	 claim	 he	
shares	with	realist	ontology	and	social	ontology.	However,	as	I	have	tried	to	establish	
in	 this	essay	 the	problem	of	AI	has	not	 come	 together	 in	any	 clear	 singular	 sense.	
Sophisticated	origins	(‘yesterday’s’)	in	philosophy	have	had	consequences.	Foci	have	
developed	 expressing	 bifurcations	 and	 marginalisations,	 and	 creating	 interstitial	
issues.	Little	 if	anything	has	been	resolved,	and	so	function	has	dominated	 in	ways	
that	are	significant	for	what	occurs	whilst	dispute	continues.	A	whole	host	of	critically	
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